Alice Little v. R.H. McMaster : Brief of Respondent by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs
1991
Alice Little v. R.H. McMaster : Brief of Respondent
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Mary C. Corporon; Corporon & Williams; Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant.
Gary D. Stott; Michael A. Peterson; Richards, Brandt, Miller & Nelson; Attorneys for Defendant/
Respondent.
This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Little v. McMaster, No. 910583.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 1991).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/3783
IFAM 




DOCKET NO. (^Hll-Ck 




R. H. McMASTER, 
Defendant/Respondent« 




RESPONDENT R. H. McMASTER fS BRIEF 
Appeal from a Final Judgment and Order Granting 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment Entered in 
the Second Judicial District Court, 
In and For Weber County, State of Utah 
The Honorable Stanton M. Taylor, Presiding 
Mary C. Corporon 
CORPORON & WILLIAMS, P.C. 
310 South Main Street, #1400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant 
Gary D. Stott 
Michael A. Peterson 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON 
Key Bank Tower, Seventh Floor 
50 South Main Street 
P. 0. Box 2465 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
Attorneys for Defendant/Respondent 
R. H. McMaster, M.D. 
m i 
A TO ^ 
wow?-^.aicassia.. 
H 1 wnwr V 
Si:H 1 V iVvu 
Clerk, Supreme Court, Utah 




R. H. McMASTER, 
Defendant/Respondent. 
Case No. 900090 
Priority 14b 
DC CV-221988 
RESPONDENT R. H. McMASTERfS BRIEF 
Appeal from a Final Judgment and Order Granting 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment Entered in 
the Second Judicial District Court, 
In and For Weber County, State of Utah 
The Honorable Stanton M. Taylor, Presiding 
Mary C. Corporon 
CORPORON & WILLIAMS, P.C. 
310 South Main Street, #1400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant 
Gary D. Stott 
Michael A. Peterson 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON 
Key Bank Tower, Seventh Floor 
50 South Main Street 
P. 0. Box 2465 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
Attorneys for Defendant/Respondent 
R. H. McMaster, M.D. 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
P a g e 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii 
JURISDICTION OF THE CQUKT AT1I) NATI1KK 
OF THE PROCEEDINGS . , . . . 1 
STATEMENT OR ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL . . . 1 
PERTINE:' * • .;•:: : TUTIONAI > PROVISIONS AI ID STATUTES . . . . 2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 2 
A. Nature of the Action . 2 
B . Si ,i; ( :.or.- ' • 3 
SUMMARY ,:i iRGUMEN ; 9 
ARGUMENT , 12 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY GRANTED THE 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 12 
A. The Plaintiff's Deposition Testimony 
Demonstrates That The Plaintiff 
Cannot State A Claim Against 
Dr. McMaster For Lack Of Informed 
Consent Under Utah Code § 78-14-5 13 
B. Dr. Steven Shirts' Affidavit Submitted 
By The Plaintiff Does Not Create An 
Issue of Fact In This Case 17 
POINT II 
EVEN IF THE PLAINTIFF HAS PRESENTED 
SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO MAKE OUT A PRIMA FACIA 
CASE OF LACK OF INFORMED CONSENT, THE PLAINTIFF'S 
CLAIM STILL FAILS AS A MATTER OF LAW BECAUSE OF 
DR. McMASTER'S STATUTORY DEFENSES . . . . , . . 24 
CONCH IS ION , 2 6 
MAILING CERTIFICATE . , 2 8 
ADDENDA 29 
-i-
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Cases 
Page 
Bonham v. Morgan, 788 P.2d 497 (Utah 1989) 13 
Burton v. Youngblood, 711 P.2d 245, 249 (Utah 1985) . 14 
C. S. v. Nielsen, 767 P.2d 504 (Utah 1988) 2 
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 
106 S. Ct. 2548, 91 L. Ed. 265, 276 (1986) 13 
Geneva Pipe Co. v. S & H Ins. Co., 714 P.2d 
648 (Utah 1986) 12 
Ramon v. Farr, 770 P.2d 131 (Utah 1989) 14,19 
State v. Locke, 688 P.2d 464 (Utah 1984) 21 
Rules 
Rule 702, Utah Rules of Evidence 10,21,22 
Statutes 
Utah Code Annotated § 78-14-5 (1976) passim 
-ii-
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ALICE LITTLE, ) 
) Case No. 900090 
Plaintiff/Appellant, ) 
) [Priority 14b] 
vs. ) 
) DC CV-221988 
R. H. McMASTER, ) 
Defendant/Respondent. ) 
RESPONDENT R. H. McMASTER'S BRIEF 
JURISDICTION OF THIS COURT AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this 
appeal pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 78-2-2(3)(j) (1989). 
The final order appealed from in this matter is the trial 
court's Summary Judgment ruling (dated February 13, 1990) 
dismissing the plaintiff's Complaint. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
The issues on appeal pertinent to the Supreme Court's 
review of the propriety of the trial court's summary judgment 
ruling are: 
1. Whether the plaintiff's deposition testimony 
reveals that she is unable to state a prima facie case 
of lack of informed consent against Dr. R. H. McMaster under 
Utah Code § 78-14-5(1). 
2. Whether the Affidavit of Dr. Steven Shirts 
can be read to create an issue of fact in this case. 
3. Whether Dr. R. H. McMaster's statutory 
defense to the plaintiff's lack of informed consent claim, 
under Utah Code § 78-14-5(2), mandated dismissal of the 
plaintiff's Complaint. 
PERTINENT CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES 
Utah Code Annotated § 78-14-5 (1976) (attached as 
Addendum "A") contains the statutory provisions that mandated 
the trial court's summary judgment dismissal of the 
plaintiff's Complaint. The case of C. S. v. Nielson, 767 
P.2d 504 (Utah 1988) is not pertinent to any issue on appeal 
because the respondent and appellant agree that an action for 
wrongful birth exists under Utah law. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Action. 
The above-captioned lawsuit is a medical malpractice 
action based upon the appellant's allegation that Dr. R. H. 
McMaster failed to obtain the appellant's informed consent 
prior to performing a tubal ligation on the appellant on May 2, 
1985. Mrs. Little maintains that her informed consent was not 
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given because she allegedly was never told there was a chance 
she could become pregnant despi * *.-• saving had the tubal ligation 
surgery. After taking the appellant's deposition during the 
discovery proceedings below, McMaster's counsel filed a 
Motion for Summary J udgmen- * e groui ids tl 1a t Mrs I .i ttl e was 
unable to state a prima facie case of lack of Informed 
consent under the requirements set forth i11 IJtah Code Annotated 
§ 78-14-5 (1976) The trial court agreed with the respondent's 
summary judgment argument and entered an Order dismissing the 
appellant's Complaint on or about February 13, 1990. 
The appellant assigns error to the trial court's 
Summary Judgment ruling because she maintains that Dr, Steven 
Shir Affidavit creates an issue of material fact in this 
case. The appellant is mistaken in advancing this argument 
because her deposition testimony, as well as the insufficiency 
of Dr. Shirts' Affidavit, make it amply c :••.,; that the 
appellant cannot assert a prima facie case of lack of 
informed consent in the present action. 
B Statement of Facts. 
Medical Treatment 
On May 2, 1985, Alice Little underwent surgery for 
C-section delivery - * ••'»- twins at - -Yiy Der* fluspit.il, 
(Record on appeal at , - *M Immediately following the 
delivery, Dr. McMaster performed a tubal ligation on the 
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plaintiff. (Affidavit of Dr. McMaster, Addendum "B.") 
(R. 22.) The tubal ligation was accomplished using the 
Pomeroy method which involves excising a loop of each 
fallopian tube. (Operative Report, Addendum "C") (R. 22.) 
Segments of the excised fallopian tubes were sent to the 
hospital laboratory. (Pathology Report, Addendum !ID.I!) 
(R. 22.) Mrs. Little does not contend in this case that 
Dr. McMaster failed to exercise the appropriate level of care 
in performing the tubal ligation procedure. (R. 1.) 
Prior to the C-section and ligation surgeries, 
Mrs. Little signed a Consent to Sterilization form which 
authorized Dr. McMaster to perform the tubal ligation. 
(Consent form, Addendum fIE.fl) (R. 2 2.) The Consent to 
Sterilization form states, in part, that: 
I [Alice Little] have asked for and 
received information concerning 
sterilization from Dr. McMaster. 
I understand that the sterilization must be 
considered permanent and not reversible. 
I have decided that I do not want to 
become pregnant or bear children, but 
understand that the results from this 
procedure cannot be guaranteed. 
The discomforts, risks and benefits 
associated with the operation have been 
explained to me. All my questions have 
been answered to my satisfaction. 
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Mrs. Little also signed a form entitled Consent to 
Operation, Anesthetics, ai id Other Medical Services (at bached as 
Addendum "F") (R, 22) prior to the C-section and ligation 
surgeries. This second consent form states, in part, that: 
The nature and purpose of the operation, 
possible alternative methods of treatment, 
the risks involved, and the possibility of 
complications have been fully explained to 
me. No guarantee or assurance has been 
given by anyone as to the results that may 
be obtained. 
Dr. McMaster made no written guarantee, warranty, 
contract or assurance of result to Alice Little concerning the 
tubal ligation. (Plaintiff's Answer to Defendant McMaster's 
Interrogatory No. 2 4, August : 1985, Addendum "G.") (R. 2 2.) 
Dr. McMastei: ma :i i itains 11 Iat i.*. •- * -;- [. 3 inec:i t o M r s - T, i * t i c i.rior 
to the tubal ligation procedure that there was no way \ <> 
guarantee that the procedure would prevent pregnancy. 
(Addendum "r,. " ) < U , .v,.) 
The medical records generated at the time Mrs. Little 
was about to undergo the C-section delivery of her twins 
indicate that she was "alert and responsive/1 that her vital 
signs were "stal )] e," that she was "comfortable" and that she 
had only had a local epidural block just prior to the time that 
she signed the two Consent forms attached as Addendum "E1" and 
Addendum "F." t : - AS the medical records demonstrate, the 
pialnti ff did ' :. ^ ceive a general anesthetic or any other 
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narcotic medication in connection with the delivery of her 
twins. (See Records at Addendum "H.") (R. 29.) 
Mrs. Little became pregnant in January 198 6, and 
subsequently gave birth to her fifth child in Montana, with the 
assistance of Dr. Charles B. Ludden. (Complaint, para. 9.) 
(R. 1.) 
Litigation 
On May 2, 1988, Mrs. Little filed suit against the 
defendants, Dr. McMaster and McKay Dee Hospital. 
(R. 1.) 
Mrs. Little stated in her deposition, taken on 
January 11, 1989, that at the time she requested Dr. McMaster 
to perform the fallopian tubal ligation procedure, she was 
aware of at least one woman who had become pregnant after 
having undergone a tubal ligation. (Plaintiff's Deposition, 
p. 32, at Addendum "I.") (R. 29.) The appellant said she was 
"scared that [what happened to the Evanston woman] could 
happen11 to her following the tubal ligation Dr. McMaster was 
to perform. (Id. p. 33) (R. 29.) Mrs. Little also stated in 
her deposition that had Dr. McMaster told her (as he insists 
he did) that she could become pregnant after her tubal ligation 
surgery, she would have readily consented to the surgery 
anyway. (Plaintiff's Deposition, p. 72, at Addendum "1.") 
(R. 29) 
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Based on the appellant's deposition testimony, 
Dr. McMaster's counsel filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on 
April 4, 1989. (R. 22.) The grounds for the motion were 
(1) that the plaintiff was not able to state a prima facie 
case of lack of informed consent, under Utah Code § 78-14-5 
(197 6), because she admitted in her deposition that she would 
have had the tubal ligation performed whether or not she had 
been fully informed that she might become pregnant following 
the ligation, (2) the plaintiff had failed to come forward with 
expert testimony which stated that Dr. McMaster had not 
complied with the applicable standard of care, and 
(3) Dr. McMaster's statutory defense, arising from the signed 
Consent to Sterilization form, precluded the plaintiff's claim 
as a matter of law. 
In response to Dr. McMaster's Motion for Summary 
Judgment, Alice Little's counsel came forward with the 
affidavit of Dr. Steven Shirts (attached as Addendum "J.") 
(R. 32.) In his affidavit, Dr. Shirts asserts that (1) the 
Consent to Sterilization form signed by Mrs. Little is 
inherently unclear "to the average layman," (2) Mrs. Little 
would not have been competent to sign the Consent to 
Sterilization form if she had received any kind of narcotic 
within one or two hours prior to signing the form, 
(3) Dr. McMaster should have told Mrs. Little that chances of 
pregnancy decrease from 1 in 125 to 1 in 3 00 if a tubal 
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ligation is performed six weeks post delivery; and (4) Alice 
Little apparently signed the Consent to Sterilization form 
just shortly before her C-section. Based on these assertions, 
Dr. Shirts concluded that Dr. McMaster fell below the 
requisite standard of care in failing to obtain Mrs. Little's 
informed consent to the ligation surgery. 
During his deposition taken on August 14, 1989, 
Dr. Shirts retracted significant portions of his affidavit 
testimony. (R. 130.) Dr. Shirts conceded in his deposition 
that, "I believe that the patient [Alice Little] received an 
epidural anesthesia, which is appropriate anesthesia for the 
surgery that is to be performed. Regional anesthesia, where 
you block a certain area of the body, I do not believe has been 
associated with negating one patient's ability to sign informed 
consent." (Dr. Shirts' deposition at p. 52.) (R. 130.) 
Dr. Shirts also conceded, in his deposition, that the statement 
in his affidavit which reads, "it appears that the obtaining of 
Alice Little's signature on the Consent was done at the last 
minute," was a statement that should be stricken from the 
affidavit. Dr. Shirts wanted the statement stricken because, 
as he stated, "as time has gone by, I've come to understand 
things better; I do not know if that's a true statement or 
not." (Dr. Shirts' deposition at p. 68.) (R. 130.) 
Following a January 29, 1990 hearing on 
Dr. McMaster's Motion for Summary Judgment, Judge Stanton 
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Taylor granted the Motion from the bench. Judge Taylor's 
Summary Judgment Order was subsequently signed on February 13, 
1990. (R. 42.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
In her Complaint, Alice Little alleges that Dr. R. H. 
McMaster did not obtain informed consent to a tubal 
ligation operation performed on the appellant because the 
doctor allegedly never told Mrs. Little that she could become 
pregnant following the operation. The appellant's claim of 
lack of informed consent fails as a matter of law because the 
appellant has admitted in her deposition testimony that a 
critical element of her statutorily defined claim is lacking in 
this case. Specifically, the appellant has admitted that the 
statutory prerequisite to bringing a claim for lack of informed 
consent contained in Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-5(1)(f) (1976) does 
not exist under the facts of this case. Mrs. Little 
unequivocally stated in her deposition that she would have 
authorized the tubal ligation performed by Dr. McMaster 
regardless of whether she had been informed that she could 
become pregnant following the ligation procedure. This 
admission by the appellant clearly destroys any lack of 
informed consent action the appellant may wish to bring against 
Dr. McMaster in connection with the tubal ligation surgery. 
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Faced with the admission, the trial court had no choice but to 
enter an order summarily dismissing the plaintiff's Complaint. 
The plaintiff's sole argument on appeal is that the 
trial court erred in entering its summary judgment order 
because the affidavit of Dr. Steven Shirts creates an issue of 
fact in this case. The appellant's contention is incorrect for 
two reasons. 
First, Dr. Shirts' affidavit cannot give life to a 
lack of informed consent claim which the appellant has already 
admitted does not exist. Alice Little has acknowledged in her 
deposition that the statutorily mandated element under Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-14-5(1)(f) is absent from this case because she 
admits she would have had the tubal ligation performed 
following her C-section even if Dr. McMaster had told her the 
procedure could not be guaranteed to prevent future pregnancy. 
This admission renders any affidavit opinion expressed by 
Dr. Shirts moot and irrelevant. Dr. Shirts cannot say that the 
plaintiff would have withheld her consent to the tubal ligation 
when Mrs. Little has already admitted just the opposite. 
Dr. Shirts' affidavit can only come into play in this case once 
the plaintiff has cleared the hurdle of asserting a 
prima facia case under Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-5 (1976). 
The Utah Supreme Court should conclude that Dr. Shirts' 
affidavit cannot be utilized to raise an issue of fact in a 
case which the plaintiff has admitted does not exist. 
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Second, Dr. Shirts' affidavit, on its face, does not 
give rise to an issue of fact because the affidavit does not 
contain a Rule 702 expert opinion pertinent to the informed 
consent issue in this case. When Dr. Shirts concludes in his 
affidavit that the consent to sterilization form signed by the 
plaintiff is too ambiguous to be understood by a lay person, 
Dr. Shirts is not bringing any specialized medical training or 
background to bear in rendering the opinion. Dr. Shirts' 
observations regarding the clarity of the language in the 
consent to sterilization form are no more persuasive or helpful 
than the trial court's opinion or any lay juror's opinion might 
be on the issue of the clarity of the form. The trial court 
properly rejected Dr. Shirts' opinion regarding the ambiguity 
in the language of the consent form because Dr. Shirts was 
obviously not speaking as an expert when he made his 
observation regarding the consent form's language. 
Additionally, Dr. Shirts' categorical opinion that 
Mrs. Little would not have been "competent" to sign the Consent 
to Sterilization form if she signed it within one or two hours 
after receiving any narcotic medication is pure speculation, 
and this opinion runs directly counter to all of the hospital 
medical records (including the carefully and neatly signed 
Consent Form itself) which indicate that Mrs. Little was 
"alert," "responsive," awake and "comfortable" at the time she 
signed the form. Dr. Shirts acknowledged in his deposition 
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that the epidural block administered to Mrs. Little prior to 
the time she signed the two Consent forms would not have 
impaired her competency to sign the forms. 
For these two reasons, Dr. Shirts' affidavit cannot 
be read to give rise to an issue of fact in this case. Since 
the appellant's sole contention in her Supreme Court brief is 
that a remand is appropriate because Dr. Shirts' affidavit 
gives rise to an issue of fact, the appellant's requested 
relief must be denied. 
Finally, even if the Mrs. Little has presented 
sufficient evidence to state a prima facie case of lack of 
informed consent, her claim was properly dismissed on the 
grounds that Dr. McMaster is protected from the claim as a 
matter of law by his statutory defenses. The Summary Judgment 
ruling entered below should be upheld on appeal. 
A R G U M E N T 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT'PROPERLY GRANTED 
THE DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT. 
As this Court reviews the trial court's summary 
judgment ruling, the appellant is entitled to have all the 
facts presented, and all the inferences fairly arising 
therefrom, considered in the light most favorable to her lack 
of informed consent claim. Geneva Pipe Co. v. S&H Ins. Co., 
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714 P.2d 648 (Utah 1986). Since a summary judgment ruling is 
granted as a matter of law rather than as a matter of fact, the 
Supreme Court reviews the trial court's legal conclusions for 
correctness, without according deference to those legal 
conclusions. Bonham v. Morgan, 788 P.2d 497 (Utah 
1989). As the United States Supreme Court has pointed out, 
however, summary judgment procedure should not be regarded as a 
disfavored procedural shortcut, but rather as an integral part 
of the Rules of Civil Procedure as a whole, "which are designed 
to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of 
every action." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 
106 S. Ct. 2548, 91 L. Ed. 2d. 265, 276 (1986). The trial 
court's summary judgment ruling in the present case should be 
upheld on appeal because the trial court properly determined 
that Alice Little is unable to state a claim of lack of 
informed consent against Dr. R. H. McMaster under Utah's 
informed consent statute. 
A. The Plaintiff's Deposition Testimony Demonstrates That 
The Plaintiff Cannot State A Claim Against Dr. McMaster 
For Lack Of Informed Consent Under Utah Code S 78-14-5. 
The sufficiency of a claim of lack of informed 
consent asserted by a plaintiff in Utah is governed by Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-14-5 (1976): 
(1) When a person submits to health care 
rendered by a health care provider, it 
shall be presumed that what the health care 
provider did was either expressly or 
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impliedly authorized to be done. For a 
patient to recover damages from a health 
care provider in an action based upon the 
provider's failure to obtain informed 
consent, the patient must prove the 
following: 
(a) That a provider-patient 
relationship existed between the 
patient and health care provider; and 
(b) the health care provider rendered 
health care to the patient; and 
(c) the patient suffered personal 
injuries arising out of the health 
care rendered; and 
(d) the health care rendered carried 
with it a substantial and significant 
risk of causing the patient serious 
harm; and 
(e) the patient was not informed of 
the substantial and significant risk; 
and 
(f) a reasonable, prudent person in 
the patient's position would not have 
consented to the health care rendered 
after having been fully informed as to 
all facts relevant to the decision to 
give consent. In determining what a 
reasonable, prudent person in the 
patient's position would do under the 
circumstances, the finder of fact 
shall use the viewpoint of the 
patient before health care was 
provided and before the occurrence of 
any personal injuries alleged to have 
arisen from said health care; and 
(g) the unauthorized part of the 
health care rendered was the proximate 
cause of personal injuries suffered by 
the patient. (Emphasis added.) 
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It is undisputed that in order to make out a prima facie 
case under this section, a plaintiff must be able to prove 
all of the above-quoted statutory elements. Ramon v. 
Farr, 770 P.2d 131 (Utah 1989); Burton v. Youncrblood, 
711 P.2d 245, 249 (Utah 1985). Without such proof, a plaintiff 
has no basis for asserting or attempting to advance an action 
for failure to obtain informed consent. Id. In the present 
case, there is no way that the plaintiff will be able to prove 
her claim of lack of informed consent because the plaintiff has 
admitted in her deposition that an essential element of her 
prima facia case cannot be established. 
Under § 78-14-5(1)(f) of the above-quoted statute, 
the appellant must prove that a person in her position, and 
with her "viewpoint," would not have consented to the tubal 
ligation surgery she underwent had that person been apprised of 
the fact that the tubal ligation procedure could not be 
guaranteed to prevent subsequent pregnancy. This element of 
Mrs. Little's prima facia case is clearly absent because 
she has admitted without hesitation in her deposition that if 
Dr. McMaster had told her (as Dr. McMaster insists he did) 
that the results from the tubal ligation procedure could not be 
guaranteed, she would nevertheless have gone forward with the 
procedure. (Plaintiff's Deposition at p. 72.) Mrs. Little 
also admitted that she knew, prior to the tubal ligation 
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performed by Dr. McMaster, of at least one woman who had 
become pregnant following a tubal ligation operation: 
(by Mr. Stott) Did you have 
friends, girl friends who had their 
tubes cut and then got pregnant? 
(by Alice Little) No, just — I 
heard of a case in Evanston where a 
lady got pregnant after her tubes 
were cut for five years. 
Did you hear about that before your 
tubes had been cut? 
Yes. 
Q. So you knew it could happen, didn't 
you? 
A. I was scared it could happen. 
Q. It was your understanding before 
you had your tubes cut that — you 
were aware that pregnancy could 
happen, even though your tubes had 
been cut; correct? 
A. I was scared that my chances — 
that it was a possibility. 
Q. If Dr. McMaster had told you that 
the results from the procedure 
could not be guaranteed, as stated 
in [the Consent to Sterilization 
form], would you still have wanted 
the tubal ligation? 
A. Yes, but I would have went on and 
had my husband fixed. 
(Plaintiff's Depo. at pp. 32-33 and 72.) (Addendum "I.") 
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Given these admissions, and the clear requirement 
under § 78-14-5(1)(f), Mrs. Little has no claim of lack of 
informed consent. The appellant knew it was possible to become 
pregnant after a tubal ligation, and she would have had 
Dr. McMaster perform the ligation on May 2, 1985 whether or 
not he guaranteed against any future pregnancies. The fact 
that Mrs. Little may have encouraged her husband to undergo a 
sterilization procedure if she had had uncertainties about the 
effectiveness of the tubal ligation operation is irrelevant to 
her claim of lack of informed consent because she has admitted 
she would have had the procedure whether or not it was 
guaranteed to prevent pregnancy. 
B. Dr. Stevens Shirts7 Affidavit Submitted by The Plaintiff 
Does Not Create An Issue of Fact In This Case. 
Mrs. Little's sole argument on appeal is that the 
trial court erred in entering its summary judgment order 
because the affidavit of Dr. Steven Shirts creates an issue of 
material fact in this case. Dr. Shirts' affidavit states that 
Dr. McMaster fell below the requisite standard of care in 
failing to obtain Mrs. Little's informed consent to the tubal 
ligation because (1) the Consent to Sterilization form is 
unclear to the average layman; (2) Dr. McMaster may not have 
told the plaintiff that the chances of pregnancy would have 
decreased from 1 in 125 to 1 in 300 if the tubal ligation would 
have been performed more than six weeks after the C-section 
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operation, (3) Alice Little was not competent to sign the 
Consent to Sterilization form if she had received any narcotic 
one or two hours prior to the time she signed the form, and 
(4) Mrs. Little apparently signed the two consent forms very 
quickly just before surgery. The appellant's contention that 
this affidavit gives rise to an issue of fact is incorrect for 
two reasons. 
1. 
First, Dr. Shirts' affidavit cannot give life to a 
lack of informed consent claim which the appellant has 
previously admitted does not exist. Mrs. Little admitted she 
would have had the tubal ligation whether or not she was told 
that she could become pregnant following the procedure! 
(Addendum "I.") When the appellant acknowledged in her 
deposition testimony that the statutorily mandated element 
under Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-5(1)(f) does not exist in this 
case, she rendered any affidavit opinion expressed by 
Dr. Shirts moot and irrelevant. There is no way that any of 
the contentions made in Dr. Shirts' affidavit can be read to 
counteract Mrs. Little's admission that she would have gone 
forward with the tubal ligation on May 2, 1985 had 
Dr. McMaster told her (as he insists he did) that there was 
no guarantee she would not become pregnant following the 
procedure. Clearly, Dr. Shirts' affidavit can only come into 
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play in this case (on the issue of whether Dr. McMaster met 
the relevant standard of care) once the plaintiff has succeeded 
in asserting a prima facia case under Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-14-5 (1976). As in any other medical malpractice case, 
expert opinion on the standard of care in a lack of informed 
consent case only becomes relevant after the plaintiff is able 
to point to a compensable injury or harm. Ramon v. Farr, 770 
P.2d 131 (Utah 1989). Alice Little has admitted in this action 
that no such compensable injury or harm exists because she has 
stated in her deposition that she would have had the tubal 
ligation procedure performed whether or not Dr. McMaster 
could have guaranteed that the procedure would have prevented 
future pregnancy. 
This Court should recognize that Utah's informed 
consent statute, Utah Code § 78-14-5 et seq., was designed 
to impose a somewhat significant burden upon plaintiffs who 
desire to assert a lack of informed consent claim. By the same 
token, the statute affords health care providers some degree of 
shelter from the heavy volume of medical malpractice claims 
being filed in court today. Indeed, the very first sentence of 
the informed consent statute states that "when a person 
submits to health care rendered by a health care provider, it 
shall be presumed that what the health care provider did was 
either expressly or impliedly authorized to be done." By 
requiring a plaintiff to make an affirmative showing of each of 
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these seven elements contained in § 78-14-5, the Utah 
Legislature has carefully established the prima facie 
showing that must be made before the presumption of adequate 
informed consent can be overcome. Because of her party 
admission in the present case, Alice Little has failed to make 
the prima facie showing which is a prerequisite to allowing 
her lack of informed consent claim to proceed to trial. 
Mrs. Little cannot be allowed to utilize the affidavit 
testimony of Dr. Steven Shirts as the source for a vital fact 
which she has already admitted does not exist. 
Dr. Shirts7 belief that Dr. McMaster should have 
informed Mrs. Little that her chances of becoming pregnant 
would have been 1 in 3 00 if she had had the tubal ligation 
performed six weeks after her C-section delivery does not 
create an issue of fact in this case for one simple reason. 
Before Dr. Shirts7 opinion regarding whether Dr. McMaster 
should have told Mrs. Little about the statistical 
probabilities can become relevant in this case, Mrs. Little 
must affirmatively show that she would not have had the tubal 
ligation performed had she been told about the statistical 
probabilities prior to the C-section delivery. Mrs. Little 
clearly has not met this threshold burden imposed by 
§ 78-14-5(1)(f) because she has admitted that she would have 
had the ligation performed despite having had any information 
from Dr. McMaster regarding the probability that she could 
-20-
become pregnant in the future. Accordingly, Dr. Shirts' 
opinion expressed in paragraph five of his affidavit has been 
rendered moot and irrelevant by Mrs. Little's party admission. 
This Court should conclude that Dr. Shirts' affidavit cannot be 
utilized to raise an issue of fact in a case which the 
plaintiff has admitted does not exist. 
2. 
Second, Dr. Shirts' affidavit, on its face, does not 
give rise to an issue of fact in this case because the 
affidavit does not contain a Rule 702 expert opinion pertinent 
to the informed consent issue in this case. It is well settled 
in this jurisdiction that expert testimony is relevant to a 
case, and will be allowed into evidence, only when the 
testimony is helpful in assisting a trier of fact with 
deliberation upon a technical issue beyond the ken of the fact 
finder. Rule 702, Utah Rules of Evidence. The matter of 
ruling upon the qualification of an expert witness lies in the 
discretion of the trial court. State v. Locke, 688 P.2d 
464 (Utah 1984). 
When Dr. Shirts concludes in his affidavit that the 
Consent to Sterilization form signed by the plaintiff is too 
ambiguous to be understood by a lay person, Dr. Shirts is not 
bringing any specialized medical training or background to bear 
in rendering the opinion. Dr. Shirts' opinion regarding the 
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clarity of the language in the Consent to Sterilization form is 
no more persuasive or helpful than the trial court's opinion or 
any lay juror's opinion might be on the issue of the clarity of 
the form. The trial court properly rejected Dr. Shirts' 
opinion regarding the ambiguity in the language of the consent 
form because Dr. Shirts was obviously not speaking as an expert 
when he made his observation regarding the consent form's 
language. 
Further, the court below properly rejected much of 
Dr. Shirts' affidavit because of its speculative and unfounded 
conclusions. Dr. Shirts' opinion that Alice Little would not 
have been competent to sign the Consent to Sterilization form 
if she had received any narcotic within one or two hours of 
signing the form was rendered nonsensical by all of the 
hospital medical records generated in this case that indicated 
at the time Mrs. Little signed the Consent to Sterilization 
form (following an epidural block) she was alert, responsive, 
awake and comfortable. (See the Medical Records attached at 
Addendum flH.lf) The trial court properly determined that the 
conjectural nature of Dr. Shirts' "competency" opinion mandated 
that such an opinion could not be submitted to a trier of fact 
under the standards set forth in Rule 7 02 of the Utah Rules of 
Evidence. Dr. Shirts conceded in his deposition that "I 
believe that the patient received an epidural anesthesia, which 
is appropriate anesthesia for the surgery that is to be 
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performed. Regional anesthesia, where you block a certain 
area of the body, I do not believe has been associated with 
ligatincr one patient's ability to sign an Informed Consent." 
(Dr. Shirts' deposition at p. 52.) 
Dr. Shirts also stated, in his deposition, that the 
statement in his affidavit indicating "it appears that the 
obtaining of Alice Little's signature on the Consent was done 
at the last minute11 was a statement that should be stricken 
from the affidavit. Dr. Shirts wanted the statement stricken 
because, as he stated, "as time has gone by, I've come to 
understand things better, I do not know if that's a true 
statement or not." (Dr. Shirts' deposition at p. 68.) 
For the two reasons outlined above, Dr. Shirts' 
affidavit cannot be read to give rise to an issue of fact in 
this case. Since the appellant's sole contention in her 
Supreme Court brief is that a remand is appropriate because 
Dr. Shirts' affidavit gives rise to an issue of fact, the 
appellant's requested relief must be denied. 
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POINT II 
EVEN IF THE PLAINTIFF HAS PRESENTED 
SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO MAKE OUT A PRIMA FACIA 
CASE OF LACK OF INFORMED CONSENT, THE PLAINTIFF'S 
CLAIM STILL FAILS AS A MATTER OF LAW BECAUSE OF 
DR. McMASTER'S STATUTORY DEFENSES. 
Under Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-5(2) (1976): 
It shall be a defense to any malpractice 
action against a health care provider 
based upon alleged failure to obtain 
informed consent if: 
e. The patient or his representative 
executed a written consent which sets 
forth the nature and purpose of the 
intended health care and which 
contains a declaration that the 
patient accepts the risk of 
substantial and serious harm, if any, 
in hopes of obtaining desired 
beneficial results of health care and 
which acknowledges that health care 
providers involved have explained his 
condition and the proposed health care 
in a satisfactory manner and that all 
questions asked about the health care 
and its attendant risks have been 
answered in a manner satisfactory to 
the patient or his representative; 
such written consent shall be a 
defense to an action against a health 
care provider based upon failure to 
obtain informed consent unless the 
patient proves that the person giving 
the consent lacked capacity to consent 
or shows by clear and convincing proof 
that the execution of the written 
consent was induced by the defendant's 
affirmative acts of fraudulent 
misrepresentation or fraudulent 
omission to state material facts. 
(Emphasis added.) 
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Not only did the trial court properly dismiss the 
plaintiff's action as a matter of law under § 78-14-5(1) (f) , 
but the action was also properly dismissed because the 
plaintiff executed a written consent pursuant to 
§ 78-14-5(2)(e). The two consent forms (attached as Addendum 
"E" and Addendum "F") establish in black and white that 
Dr. McMaster has a very powerful statutory defense to the 
appellant's claim under § 78-14-5(2) (e) . The consent forms 
contain every element of the written consent defense that is 
required in the above-quoted statute. Once these consent forms 
were advanced by Dr. McMaster, § 78-14-5(2)(e) shifted the 
burden to the appellant to prove that the written consent 
defense could somehow be avoided. The appellant made no 
attempt during the Summary Judgment proceedings below to show 
how the written consent defense could be overcome. 
The appellant does not pretend in this action that a 
written consent defense may be avoided on the basis that 
Dr. McMaster committed any affirmative act of fraudulent 
misrepresentation or because Dr. McMaster fraudulently 
omitted to state material facts. Such contentions have never 
been advanced by Mrs. Little in this case. Furthermore, any 
claim by the plaintiff that she lacked capacity to consent is 
futile in this case. The medical records generated at the time 
the plaintiff executed the written consent indicate that she 
was "alert and responsive," that her vital signs were "stable" 
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and that she was "comfortable." (See Medical Record attached 
hereto as Addendum "H.") The plaintiff's own expert, 
Dr. Steven Shirts, has admitted that the local epidural block 
administered to Mrs. Little likely did not affect her ability 
to read, understand and sign the two consent forms quoted on 
pages four and five above. (Dr. Shirts' deposition at p. 52.) 
All of the evidence in this case indicates that Mrs. Little's 
capacity to read, to understand what she was reading, and to 
sign her name were all fully intact at the time she executed 
the written consents attached as Addendum "E" and Addendum 
"F." The plaintiff has come forward with no evidence upon 
which to base a claim that she was not competent to read, 
understand and sign the consent forms at issue. 
CONCLUSION 
The appellant's lack of informed consent claim 
against Dr. McMaster was properly dismissed on the grounds 
that Mrs. Little has failed to come forward with evidence 
sufficient to make out her prima facie case under Utah 
Code § 78-14-5. The affidavit of Dr. Steven Shirts is wholly 
insufficient to give rise to an issue of material fact in a 
case the appellant has admitted does not exist. Even if 
Mrs. Little has presented sufficient evidence to state a 
prima facie case of lack of informed consent, her claim was 
properly dismissed on the grounds that Dr. McMaster is 
-26-
protected from the claim as a matter of law by his statutory 
defenses. The Summary Judgment ruling entered below should be 
upheld on appeal. 
DATED this / / day of September, 199 0. 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER 
& NELSON 
Gary 
Michael A. Peterson 
Attorneys for Respondent 
Robert H. McMaster, M.D. 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that four true and correct copies 
of the foregoing instrument were mailed, first class, postage 
prepaid this /^ day of September, 1990, to the following 
counsel of record: 
Mary C. Corporon, Esq. 
CORPORON & WILLIAMS 
Suite 1100 - Boston Building 
#9 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 





A D D E N D A 
29 
A D D E N D U M A 
78-14-5 JUDICIAL CODE 
tal, medical, dental, or other health care services, except benefits received 
as gifts, contributions, or assistance made gratuitously; and 
(d) any contractual or voluntary wage continuation plan provided by 
employers or any other system intended to provide wages during a period 
of disability. 
(3) To preserve subrogation rights for amounts paid or received prior to 
settlement or judgment, a provider of collateral sources shall serve at least 30 
days before settlement or trial of the action a written notice upon each health 
care provider against whom the malpractice action has been asserted. The 
written notice shall state the name and address of the provider of collateral 
sources, the amount of collateral sources paid, the names and addresses of all 
persons who received payment, and the items and purposes for which payment 
has been made. 
(4) Evidence is admissible of government programs that provide payments 
or benefits available in the future to or for the benefit of the plaintiff to the 
extent available irrespective of the recipient's ability to pay. Evidence of the 
likelihood or unlikelihood that such programs, payments, or benefits will be 
available in the future is also admissible. The trier of fact may consider such 
evidence in determining the amount of damages awarded to a plaintiff for 
future expenses. 
(5) No provider of collateral sources is entitled to recover the amounts of 
such benefits from a health care provider, the plaintiff, or any other person or 
entity as reimbursement for collateral source payments made prior to settle-
ment or judgment, including any payments made under Chapter 19, Title 26, 
except to the extent that subrogation rights to amounts paid prior to settle-
ment or judgment are preserved as provided in this section. All policies of 
insurance providing benefits affected by this section are construed in accor-
dance with this section. 
History: C. 1953, 78-14-4.5, enacted by L. ch. 237 provided: "This act takes effect on July 
1985, ch. 237, § 1. 1, 1985." 
Effective Dates. — Section 2 of Laws 1985, 
78-14-5. Failure to obtain informed consent — Proof re-
quired of patient — Defenses — Consent to health 
care. 
(1) When a person submits to health care rendered by a health care pro-
vider, it shall be presumed that what the health care provider did was either 
expressly or impliedly authorized to be done. For a patient to recover damages 
from a health care provider in an action based upon the provider's failure to 
obtain informed consent, the patient must prove the following: 
(a) that a provider-patient relationship existed between the patient 
and health care provider; and 
(b) the health care provider rendered health care to the patient; and 
(c) the patient suffered personal injuries arising out of the health care 
rendered; and 
(d) the health care rendered carried with it a substantial and signifi-
cant risk of causing the patient serious harm; and 
(e) the patient was not informed of the substantial and significant risk; 
and 
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tal, medical, dental, or other health care services, except benefits received 
as gifts, contributions, or assistance made gratuitously; and 
(d) any contractual or voluntary wage continuation plan provided by 
employers or any other system intended to provide wages during a period 
of disability. 
(3) To preserve subrogation rights for amounts paid or received prior to 
settlement or judgment, a provider of collateral sources shall serve at least 30 
days before settlement or trial of the action a written notice upon each health 
care provider against whom the malpractice action has been asserted. The 
written notice shall state the name and address of the provider of collateral 
sources, the amount of collateral sources paid, the names and addresses of all 
persons who received payment, and the items and purposes for which payment 
has been made. 
(4) Evidence is admissible of government programs that provide payments 
or benefits available in the future to or for the benefit of the plaintiff to the 
extent available irrespective of the recipient's ability to pay. Evidence of the 
likelihood or unlikelihood that such programs, payments, or benefits will be 
available in the future is also admissible. The trier of fact may consider such 
evidence in determining the amount of damages awarded to a plaintiff for 
future expenses. 
(5) No provider of collateral sources is entitled to recover the amounts of 
such benefits from a health care provider, the plaintiff, or any other person or 
entity as reimbursement for collateral source payments made prior to settle-
ment or judgment, including any payments made under Chapter 19, Title 26, 
except to the extent that subrogation rights to amounts paid prior to settle-
ment or judgment are preserved as provided in this section. All policies of 
insurance providing benefits affected by this section are construed in accor-
dance with this section. 
History: C. 1953, 78-14-4.5, enacted by L. ch. 237 provided: 'This act takes effect on July 
1985, ch. 237, § 1. 1, 1985." 
Effective Dates. — Section 2 of Laws 1985, 
78-14-5. Failure to obtain informed consent — Proof re-
quired of patient — Defenses — Consent to health 
care. 
(1) When a person submits to health care rendered,by a health care pro-
vider, it shall be presumed that what the health care provider did was either 
expressly or impliedly authorized to be done. For a patient to recover damages 
from a health care provider in an action based upon the provider's failure to 
obtain informed consent, the patient must prove the following: 
(a) that a provider-patient relationship existed between the patient 
and health care provider; and 
(b) the health care provider rendered health care to the patient; and 
(c) the patient suffered personal injuries arising out of the health care 
rendered; and 
(d) the health care rendered carried with it a substantial and signifi-
cant risk of causing the patient serious harm; and 
(e) the patient was not informed of the substantial and significant risk; 
and 
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(f) a reasonable, prudent person in the patient's position would not 
have consented to the health care rendered after having been fully in-
formed as to all facts relevant to the decision to give consent. In determin-
ing what a reasonable, prudent person in the patient's position would do 
under the circumstances, the finder of fact shall use the viewpoint of the 
patient before health care was provided and before the occurrence of any 
personal injuries alleged to have arisen from said health care; and 
(g) the unauthorized part of the health care rendered was the proxi-
mate cause of personal injuries suffered by the patient. 
(2) It shall be a defense to any malpractice action against a health care 
provider based upon alleged failure to obtain informed consent if: 
(a) the risk of the serious harm which the patient actually suffered was 
relatively minor; or 
(b) the risk of serious harm to the patient from the health care provider 
was commonly known to the public; or 
(c) the patient stated, prior to receiving the health care complained of, 
that he would accept the health care involved regardless of the risk; or 
that he did not want to be informed of the matters to which he would be 
entitled to be informed; or 
(d) the health care provider, after considering all of the attendant facts 
and circumstances, used reasonable discretion as to the manner and ex-
tent to which risks were disclosed, if the health care provider reasonably 
believed that additional disclosures could be expected to have a substan-
tial and adverse effect on the patient's condition; or 
(e) the patient or his representative executed a written consent which 
sets forth the nature and purpose of the intended health care and which 
contains a declaration that the patient accepts the risk of substantial and 
serious harm, if any, in hopes of obtaining desired beneficial results of 
health care and which acknowledges that health care providers involved 
have explained his condition and the proposed health care in a satisfac-
tory manner and that all questions asked about the health care and its 
attendant risks have been answered in a manner satisfactory to the pa-
tient or his representative; such written consent shall be a defense to an 
action against a health care provider based upon failure to obtain in-
formed consent unless the patient proves that the person giving the con-
sent lacked capacity to consent or shows by clear and convincing proof 
that the execution of the written consent was induced by the defendant's 
affirmative acts of fraudulent misrepresentation or fraudulent omission 
to state material facts. 
(3) Nothing contained in this act shall be construed to prevent any person 
eighteen years of age or over from refusing to consent to health care for his 
own person upon personal or religious grounds. 
(4) The following persons are authorized and empowered to consent to any 
health care not prohibited by law: 
(a) any parent, whether an adult or a minor, for his minor child; 
(b) any married person, for a spouse; 
(c) any person temporarily standing in loco parentis, whether formally 
serving or not, for the minor under his care and any guardian for his 
ward; 
(d) any person eighteen years of age or over for his or her parent who is 
unable by reason of age, physical or mental condition, to provide such 
consent; 
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(e) any patient eighteen years of age or over; 
(f) any female regardless of age or marital status, when given in con-
nection with her pregnancy or childbirth; 
(g) in the absence of a parent, any adult for his minor brother or sister; 
and 
(h) in the absence of a parent, any grandparent for his minor grand-
child. 
(5) No person who in good faith consents or authorizes health care treat-
ment or procedures for another as provided by this act shall be subject to civil 
liability. 
History: L. 1976, ch. 23, § 5. 
Meaning of "this act". — The phrase "this 
act", referred to in Subsections (3) and (5), 
means Laws 1976, Chapter 23, which enacted 
this chapter and § 78-14-11 and amended 
§§ 31-3-1, 31-5-21, and 78-12-28. 
Cross-References . — Abortion, informed 
consent requirements, §§ 76-7-305, 76-7-305.5. 
ANALYSIS 
In general. 
Pregnancy and childbirth. 
—Husband's consent. 
Proof required. 
In genera l . 
T h i s . section merely sets forth the factual 
showing required for a patient to recover dam-
ages from a health care provider for failure to 
obtain "informed consent," and establishes a 
safe harbor for health care providers relative to 
informed consent in the context of civil mal-
practice litigation. It does not constitute a gen-
eral consent law mandating parental consent 
for family planning services as well as other 
kinds of medical care. Planned Parenthood 
Ass'n v. Dandoy, 635 F. Supp. 184 (D. Utah 
1986). 
Brigham Young Law Review. — Califor-
nia Supreme Court Expands the Informed Con-
sent Doctrine; Physicians Have a Duty to Ob-
tain an Informed Refusal: Truman v. Thomas, 
1980 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 933. 
Blood donation by minor over eighteen, pa-
rental consent not required, § 15-2-5. 
Sterilization, informed consent for proce-
dure, § 64-10-1. 
Venereal disease, minor's power to consent 
to treatment, § 26-6-18. 
Pregnancy and childbirth. 
—Husband's consent. 
Where married pregnant woman is in full 
possession of her faculties, she alone has the 
power to submit to surgical procedures upon 
herself; husband's consent to such medical pro-
cedures is not required. Reiser v. Lohner, 641 
P.2d 93 (Utah 1982). 
Proof required. 
To make out a prima facie case of failure to 
obtain informed consent, the patient must 
prove all of the statutory elements in Subsec-
tion (1). Burton v. Youngblood, 711 P.2d 245 
(Utah 1985). 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 51 Am. Jur . 2d Physicians, 
Surgeons, and Other Healers § 200 et seq. 
C.J.S. — 70 C J .S . Physicians and Surgeons 
§ 48. 
Key Number s . — Physicians and Surgeons 
*» 15(8), 16. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
330 
A D D E N D U M B 
GARY D. STOTT 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER 
& NELSON 
Attorneys for Respondent Robert H. McMaster, M.D. 
CSB Tower, Suite 700 
50 South Main Street 
P.O. Box 2465 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
Telephone: (801) 531-1777 
BEFORE THE DIVISION OF OCCUPATIONAL AND PROFESSIONAL LICENSING 




R. H. MCMASTER, M.D., 
MCKAY DEE HOSPITAL, 
Respondents. 
STATE OF-ARIZONA^ T/fr/V ) 
County of -Mztricopa£^ £") 
Robert H. McMaster, M.D., being first duly sworn, 
deposes and says: 
1. That at all times relevant to the claims of the 
petitioner as stated in the Notice of Intent to Commence 
Action, I was a licensed medical doctor authorized to practice 
medicine in the State of Utah. I am Board Certified in 
obstetrics and gynecology. 
2. On or about May 2, 1985, I performed a 
C-section on the claimant with the delivery of twins. 
AFFIDAVIT OF 
ROBERT H. MCMASTER, M.D, 
Case No. PR- 87-10-035 
3. After the delivery, I performed a tubal ligatic 
using-the Pomeroy method. A copy of the operative report is 
attached "to'the affidavit. Within the operative report it is 
stated that each tube was grasped at the mid-portion with a 
Babcock. A loop of the tube was then ligated with a plain tie, 
and a portion of the loop was excised. The attached Pathology 
Report confirms that portions of each fallopian tube were 
removed. 
4. Within the medical records which pertain to the 
tubal ligation is a copy of a consent form which was signed by 
the claimant for the sterilization procedure. I discussed wit* 
the claimant that the procedure could not be guaranteed to 1005< 
eliminate a subsequent pregnancy. Knowing that risk the 
claimant proceeded with the requested tubal ligation. 
5. On or about February 25, 198 6, I again saw the 
claimant. She indicated she was pregnant with an estimated 
date of confinement for October 1, 198 6. That is the last 
contact that I had with the claimant. 
6. It is my opinion that I met the standard of 
care in doing the tubal ligation, and in discussing the 
procedure with the claimant. I feel that there was sufficient 
discussion and information available to the claimant to 
properly inform her of the consequences of the procedure and 
its potential success. I do not feel that I departed from the 
standard of care in any manner. The procedure that was used 
was an accepted surgical procedure. 
-2-
DATED this stf / ' day of December, 1987. 
Robert H. McMaster, M.D. 
P, SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this -y7^" day < 
AUUlt'rrUs^'Ly 1987, by Robert H. McMaster, M.D. 
."My Commission Expires: 
K^UA^'J 
<^ 
rtCtzC; c. a^ NOTARY/PUBLIC 
Residing at: y 




I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of tA 
foregoing instrument was mailed, first class, postage prepaid 
this day of December, 1987, to the following counsel of 
record: 
Mary C. Corporon, Esq. 
CORPORON & WILLIAMS 
#9 Exchange Place 
Suite 1100, Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
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17024A31 DATE 5 
Dr. McMaster 
Right and l e f t fa l lop ian tube. 
TWO SEGMENTS OF FALLOPIAN'TUBES 
(2)C 
GROSS: 
The first speimen is labeled "right" and consists of a cylindrical portion of soft 
pinkish tan tissue with a length of 1 cm. and a diameter of 8 mm. Portion embedded 
The second specimen is labeled "left" and consists of a cylindrical portlonof soft 
pinkish tan tissue with a length of 1 cm. and a diameter of 8 mm. Portion embedded 
MICROSCOPIC: 
Each of the cylindrical specimensis composed of a completely transected segment 
of histologically normal appearing fallopian tube. 




A D D E N D U M E 
l i m f , ALtCF KSMcKAY-DEE 
STATEftfew¥6^ uftflEtfsTANDING ' 
AND CONSENT TO STERILIZATION OPERATION-
I have ajked for ^nd received information concerning s t e r i l i z a t i o n from 
D r XY\r ffta.c, LQ A . a member of the Medical Staf f of the McKay-Dee 
Hospital Center. I was to ld that I could decide not to be s t e r i l i z e d . I f I 
decide not to be s t e r i l i z e d , rny decision w i l l not a f fec t my r i gh t to future care 
or treatment. 
I understand the nature, purpose, e f fec ts , r i s k s , benefits and al ternat ives 
to an operation for the purpose of s t e r i l i z a t i o n . I understand that the s t e r i l i z a -
t ion must be considered permanent and not revers ib le . I have decided that I do 
not want to become pregnant or bear ch i ld ren, but understand that the resul ts from 
th is procedure cannot be guaranteed. 
I was to ld about those temporary methods of b i r t h control that are avai lable 
and could be provided to me which w i l l allow me to bear a ch i ld in the fu tu re . I 
have rejected these al ternat ives and chosen to be s t e r i l i z e d . 
j I understand that I Wi l l be s t e r i l i z e d by an operation known as R', s&i c c.inO 
\Jcd?M(\ .//>?<*-fa**Jh& discomforts, r isks and benefi ts associated wi th the 
operation hive been explained to me. A l l my questions have been answered to my 
sa t i s fac t i on . 
I , AAC'xJ> I r x i J t d h x o , hereby consent of my own free w i l l to be 
s te r i l i zed by ^ n>ni r?/ \ . f r f? ~~ > M -D - and/or associates and assistants 
of his/her choice to perform the fol lowing operation upon me at the McKay-Dee 
Hospital Center ( c i r c l e one) laparoscopic tubal coagulat ion, pomeroy tubal l i g a t i o n , 
salpingectomy, hu'lka c l i p . 
Patient Signature 
^JMAMJ 
Signature of Witness 
( IF AN INTERPRETER IS PROVIDED TO ASSIST THE INDIVIDUAL TO BE STERILIZED) 
I have translated the information and advice presented o r a l l y to the indiv idual to 
be s t e r i l i z e d by the person obtaining th is consent. I have also read to 
the consent form in
 P __ r __^__ r __ language and 
explained i t s contents. To the best of my knowledge and,be l ie f , she understood 
th is explanation. 
Interpreter Date 
Form § 686-AB-5/84R-596 
A D D E N D U M F 
McKAY-DEE 
TiM HOSPITAL CENTER 
3939 Morrison Blvd . Ogden. U»on 84409 r , : r . A ' T - R . R~ « r t 1 T Y 
CONSENT TO OPERATION, ANESTHETICS, AND OTHER MEDICAL SERVICES 
^ 19 Time P .M. 
1. I authorize the performance upon p \ x 
of the following operation Q ~-^Sc. :1 ^  r /wi { y<l-tl0r\. 
to be performed under the direction of Dr. a \r \) \ c?.J"T C /) 
2. I consent to the performance of operations and procedures, including x-rays, 
in addition to or different from those now contemplated, whether or not arising from 
presently unforeseen conditions, which the above-named doctor or his associates or 
assistants may consider necessary or advisable in the course of the operation. 
3. I consent to the administration of such anesthetics as may be considered 
necessary or advisable by the physician responsible for this service. 
4. For the purpose of advancing medical education, I consent to the admittance 
of medical personnel to the operating room. 
5. The nature and purpose of the operation, possible alternative methods of 
treatment, the risks involved, and the possibility of complications have been fully 
explained to me. No guarantee or assurance has been given by anyone as to the 
results that may be obtained. 
6. I consent to the dxamination of any t issues or parts which may be removed 
from my body by the hospital authorities and further consent to the disposal of such 
tissues and parts by the hospital authorities. 
Signed /•fa Jrf/f 
Witness: Relationship to Patient 
A D D E N D U M G 
MARY C. CORPORON #734 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
CORPORON & WILLIAMS 
Suite 1100 - Boston Building 
#9 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
(801) 328-1162 
IN IHE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, 
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH. 
ALICE LITTLE, PLAINTIFF'S ANSWERS TO DEFENDANT 
R. H. McMASTER'S FIRST SET OF 
Plaintiff, INTERROGATORIES 
-vs-
R. H. McMASTERS and McKAY-DEE Civil No. CV-221988 
HOSPITAL, 
Defendants. 
COMES NOW THE PLAINTIFF to the above-entitled action, by and through 
counsel, and hereby responds to and answers Defendant R. H. McMaster's First 
Set of Interrogatories to Plaintiff, as follows: 
INTERROGATORY NO. 1: 
State your full name, address and birthdate. 
ANSWER: 
Alice Louise Little, P. 0. Box 393, Whitefish, Montana, bom 3/29/58. 
INTERROATORY NO. 2: 
What is your marital status? 
ANSWER: 
Married. 
Plaintiff has not determined at this time what other witnesses may or 
will be called to testify on her behalf. At such as this information has been 
determined, plaintiff will amend her answers accordingly. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 22: 
Identify each person you or your attorney expect to call as an expert 
witness at trial. With respect to each person, state their present address 
and telephone number, the subject matter on which each is expeted to tesfify, 
and the substance of the facts and opinions on which the exper is expected to 
testify as grounds for each opinion. 
ANSWER: 
See Answer to Interrogatory No. 21, above. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 23: 
Do you contend that you have suffered any loss of wages, earnings or 
income as a result of the alleged misconduct of this defendant? If the 
anmswer is "yes," please indicate the precise amount which you contend has 
been lost to the date of your answers to these Interrogatories. 
ANSWER: 
Yes. I contend that I have lost the opportunity to earn wages since 
approximately eleven weeks into my fourth pregnancy for reason that the burden 
of caring for four children four years of age and younger and the physical 
complications of my last pregnancy have made it impossible for me to work. I 
have therefore lost at least minimum wages from at least part-time employment 
since June 1986. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 24: 
Does plaintiff allege that defendant made any guarantee, warranty, 
contract or assurance of result to be obtained concerning the treatment of 
plaintiff in writing and signed by defendant or an authorized agent of the 
8 
defendant? If the answer is "yes," and plaintiff will do so without a formal 
Request for Production of Documents, please attach a copy of said guarantee, 
warranty or contract of assurance. 
ANSWER: 
No, plaintiff does not allege that defendants made any guarantee, 
warranty, contract or assurance of result to be obtained concerning the 
treatment, in writing. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 25: 
State the date of birth of the child born subsequent to the May 2, 1985 
tubal ligation performed on you. 
ANSWER: 
September 23, 1986. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 26: 
In Paragraph 9 of your Complaint, you state that you "discovered this 
pregnancy in approximately March 1986." State the details of when and how you 
discovered this pregnancy. 
ANSWER: 
Plaintiff had a pregnancy test performed in approximately March 1986, 
which confirmed her pregnancy. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 27: 
On what factual basis do you rely in contending that the tubal ligation 
performed on you on May 2, 1985 "did not work" as alleged in Paragraph 10 of 
your Complaint? 
ANSWER: 
Plaintiff was advised by the defendant, Dr. McMaster, that the tubal 
ligation performed by him on May 2, 1985 would prevent her from ever becoming 
pregnant again. In fact, he counseled with plaintiff that she should be very 
9 
STATE OF MMEANA ) 
COUNTY Q^^CaZA^^ ) 
ALICE LITTLE, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and states as 
follows: She is the plaintiff to the above-entitled action, she has read the 
foregoing Plaintiff's Answers to Defendant R. H. McMaster's First Set of 
Interogatories, including all attachments, and understands the contents 




SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me by Alice Little this ^ 1 day of 
August, 1988. 
(fS*NT\Q,. 
NOTARY PUBLIC . ~^U#-V^£iOx5L 
Residing a t ppl 
S ta t e of Montana 
My commission expires: 
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A D D E N D U M I 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 









Civil No. CV-221988 
* * * 
BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 11th day of January, 
1989, the deposition of ALICE LITTLE, produced as a witness 
herein at the instance of the defendants herein, in the 
above-entitled action now pending in the above-named court, 
was taken before VIKI E. HATTON, a Certified Shorthand 
Reporter and Notary Public in and for the State of Utah, 
commencing at the hour of 10:00 a.m. of said day at the 
offices of RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON, 50 South Main 
Street, Salt Lake City, Utah. 
That said deposition was taken pursuant to notice, 



























A I just took it it was the cesarean and the tubal. 
You know, the tubal was underneath it, and I knew I was going 
to have the tubal anyway, I knew I was going to have the 
tubal, I didn't want any more kids. 
Q You consented to the tubal, didn't you? 
A Yes. 
(Whereupon, Exhibit No. 1 
was marked 
for identification.) 
Q (BY MR. STOTT) Mrs. Little, showing you a document 
that has been marked as Exhibit 1, it has as a heading, 
"Statement of Understanding of Consent to Sterilization 
Operation" on the stationery of McKay Dee Hospital Center. 
I'll ask you to look at that and tell me if your signature 
appears on that copy? 
A Yes, it does. 
Q And does it appear on the line where it says 
"patient signature"? 
A Yes. 
Q There's a signature underneath yours where it says 
"signature of witness." What is that name? 
A Berry. I can't read — I don't know if it's a T or 
a J. I don't know what the first letter is. 
Q Do you know that person? 
A Not by last name. 
Q Do you know the person who signed this as witness on 
23 
it? 
A Judy is the one that had me sign it. But I don't 
know what her last name was. 
Q Does your writing appear on that document in any 
other place? 
A Yes, right here (indicating). 
Q Tell me what that says. Does it say Alice Little? 
A Yes. No/ this is not my writing. 
Q None of that is yours? 
A Just this (indicating). 
Q The only writing that's yours on this document is 
your signature? 
A Yes. 
Q Nowf the document at the top has a blank where Dr. 
McMasters1 name is written in, doesn't it? 
A Yes. 
Q And then two paragraphs above your signature, there 
is a statement which says and I quote, "I understand that I 
will be sterilized by an operation known as bilateral tubal 
ligation." Those words are written in, aren't they? 
A Yes. 
Q Do you see that? 
A Yes. 
Q Were those words written in those blanks before you 



























tubes being tied or cut; is that correct? 
A Yes. 
Q Is it your testimony here today that your 
understanding was that if you had your tubes tied or your 
tubes cut, that you could not get pregnant again? 
A Yes. 
Q No way you could get pregnant again once your tubes 
were cut? Was that your understanding? 
A Yes. I — nothing. 
Q Ycu what? 
A I just thought — I had my husband talked into it. 
To be double sure, because in Evanston, a lot of people were 
getting pregnant and having their tubes cut, so I was going to 
have my husband fixed to be sure. 
Q Did you have friends, girlfriends who had had their 
tubes cut and then they got pregnant? 
A No, just — I heard of a case in Evanston where a 
lady got pregnant after her tubes were cut for five years. 
Q Did you hear about that before your tubes had been 
cut? 
A Yes. 
Q Did you ever discuss that fact with Dr. McMasters? 
A No. 
Q Did you ever raise that with him, tell him what 
you'd heard? 
A 





















No, I just told him I wanted my husband to get fixed 
Id be double protected. 
You told us about that meeting, didn't you? 
Yes. 
Did you have acquaintances or family members who had 
tubes cut or tied and then subsequently got 
No. 
Do you know of anybody personally who that happened 
No. 
But you had heard in Evanston before you had your 
of ladies that had gotten pregnant after their tubes 
cut? 
Of a lady, yes. 
A lady? 
Yes. 
So you knew it could happen, didn't you? 
I was scared that it could happen. 
It was your understanding before you had your tubes 
— you were aware that pregnancy could happen, even 




I was scared that my chances -- that it was a 
ty. 
Did you or your husband ever use any type of birth 
72 
1 and when I went to surgery/ she was with me. And Dr. 
2 McMasters, they came in together. 
3 MR. ERICKSON: The hospital doesn't have any further 
4 questions. 
5 FURTHER EXAMINATION 
6 BY MR. STOTTr 
7 Q Mrs. Little, looking at Exhibit 1, if you would, if 
8 you had been told that the information — let me back up. 
9 If Dr. McMasters had told you that the results from 
10 the procedure could not be guaranteed, as stated in Exhibit 1, 
11 would you still have wanted the tubal ligation? 
12 A Yes, but I would have went on and had my husband 
13 fixed. 
14 MR. STOTT: That's all. 











A D D E N D U M J 
MARY C. CORPORON #7 34 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
CORPORON & WILLIAMS 
Suite 1100 - Boston Building 
#9 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
(801) 328-1162 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, 
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH. 
ALICE LITTLE, 
Plaintiff, AFFIDAVIT OF DR. STEVEN R. SHIRTS 
-vs-
R. H. McMASTER and McKAY Civil No. CV-221988 
DEE HOSPITAL, 
Defendants. 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
I, DR. STEVEN R. SHIRTS, being first duly sworn upon oath, 
deposes and states as follows: 
1. I am a physician duly licensed to practice medicine in 
the State of Utah and am practicing in Salt Lake County, State of 
Utah. I have hospital privileges at Pioneer Valley Hospital and 
practice exclusively in the field of obstetrics and gynecology. 
I am board certified with the American Board of Obstetrics and 
Gynecology. 
2. I have reviewed the medical records of the plaintiff to 
the above-captioned matter, Alice Little, pertaining to her 
pregnancy which resulted in the birth of twins on May 2, 1985. 
In that pregnancy she was assisted by the defendant above-named, 
Dr. R. H. McMaster. The delivery by Caesarean Section and a 
tubal ligation were performed by Dr. R. H. McMaster at the 
defendant McKay Dee Hospital. 
3. I have reviewed the document entitled "Statement of 
Understanding and Consent to Sterilization Operation" signed by 
Alice Little, which is undated. A true and correct copy of this 
statement is attached hereto and incorporated herein by reference 
as "Exhibit A." 
4. In my opinion, the "Statement of Understanding and 
Consent to Sterilization Operation" would be and is unclear to 
the average layman, in that it states that the operation "must be 
considered permanent and not reversible . . .", but in that it 
also states that the results from this procedure "cannot be 
guaranteed." In my opinion, the phrase and statement that the 
result of this procedure "cannot be guaranteed" is not adequate 
to inform the patient that she may become pregnant after 
performance of this procedure. 
5. In my opinion, the statistical probability that Alice 
Little would become pregnant after performance of a tubal 
ligation, performed immediately post-Caesarean, would be 
approximately 1 in 125. These odds would increase, in favor of 
permanent sterilization, to approximately 1 in 300" if 
sterilization were performed six weeks or more post-delivery. In 
my opinion, any patient contemplating a tubal ligation should be 
informed of those options and statistics and the risks of 
becoming pregnant in spite of the surgery. 
6. Any patient consenting to any surgery, including a 
2 
sterilization operation post-Caesarean, as was done in this case, 
should be requested to sign a statement of understanding and 
consent to sterilization before any type of anesthesia or pre-
operative medication is administered. If Alice Little signed the 
"Statement of Understanding and Consent to Sterilization 
Operation" after receiving any kind of narcotic within the one or 
two hours prior, then she would not have been competent to sign a 
consent to the surgery, even though she may have been conscious. 
7. In my review of the medical records, I did not note any 
indication that Dr. McMaster had taken the time to discuss the 
risks of the performance of the sterilization procedure with his 
patient, Alice Little, including the risk that she may still 
become pregnant, either in his records and notes of office visits 
with Alice Little, in the hospital prior to the surgeries or at 
any time prior to the performance of the tubal ligation. 
8. In my opinion, the defendant, McKay Dee Hospital, is 
also responsible to advise its surgery patients of substantial 
and significant risks which may result from surgery performed in 
their hospital. In my opinion, the risk of becoming pregnant 
after performance of tubal ligation surgery is a substantial and 
significant risk. It appears that the obtaining of Alice 
Little's signature on the "consent" was done at the last minute. 
The form is undated and untimed, and it is not even completely 
filled in, in that the patient apparently did not understand 
exactly what procedure was about to be performed on her because 
she did not cirle the appropriate procedure where indicated. 
Therefore, I question whether Alice Little was given time to read 
the form prior to signing it, nor do I believe that she had an 
3 
understanding of the procedure to be performed. I question if 
the person obtaining her signature took the time to explain to 
her what she was signing. Certainly, the hospital employee 
securing the signature did not have the form completed 
satisfactorily. 
9. In my opinion, the defendants, R. H. McMaster and McKay 
Dee Hospital, fell below the standard of care of physicians 
practicing in the State of Utah and/or hospitals in the State of 
Utah in their treatment of Alice Little, in failing to advise 
Alice Little of substantial and serious risks of her tubal 
ligation surgery performed in 1985, in failing to clearly advise 
her that she might become pregnant after the surgery. 
/4u~ CI. y£i>L A N - 5 * 
ON THE ;V 
DR. STEVEN R. SHIRTS 
Affiant 
day of April, 1989, personally appeared before 
me, the undersigned notary, Dr. Steven R. Shirts, the signer of 
the foregoing Affidavit, who duly acknowledged to me that he 
signed the same voluntarily and for its stated purpose. 
A.. 7 'U\;A '-^ rfjf/f):f>'^s 
: I 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Residing at Salt Lake County 
My Commission Expires: 
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